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A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: 
"THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY" AFTER 25 YEARS' 
Thomas Samuel Eberle 
Soziologisches Seminar, Hochschule St. Gallen 
It was one of Alfred Schutz' major unrealized projects, prevented by his early 
death, to formulate a new theoretical foundation for the sociology of knowledge. 
His blend of phenomenology and Weberian sociology promised to locate the 
sociology of knowledge on new ground, redefining its perspective as well as its 
basic concepts. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, who had studied at the 
New School for Social Research in New York where Schutz had taught, decided 
to pursue this project when they met as junior members of the Graduate Faculty 
at their "Alma Mater". The result was quite dramatic: a modem sociological 
"classic" was born. 
The Social Construction of Reality by Berger and Luckmann has become one 
of the most cited sociological books of the past 25 years. Its title is, undoubtedly, 
one of their outstanding achievements. Its contents, however, while brilliantly 
written have possibly never been really understood by many of its readers. 
Some have said, rather maliciously, that the book sold so well because many 
engineers (mistakenly) bought it. Unfortunately, I may add, of the many 
sociologists who bought or cited the book only a few have studied it.. 
The current twenty-fifrh anniversary of Social Construction invites us to 
reassess this book, to evaluate the impact it has exerted on the sociological 
landscape, and to examine its legacy. 
1. The Book and its Message 
The logic of the Social Construction was simple: Society must be grasped in 
its duality as an "objective" and a "subjective" reality. The objective social 
reality, although produced by social action, appears to the individual as separa- 
te and independent from him or her. The subjective side consists in the 
consciousness an actor has, shaped in pervasive processes of socialization, and 
sustained and modified in daily interactions. In this duality the seeming 
* This is a vastly elaborated version of Eberle 1992. I am grateful to Deirde Boden and to 
Christopher Prendergast for their helpful comments and thei generosity to let me tap extensively 
their native speakers' language competence. 
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dichotomy of Durkheim and Weber was reconciled, and the basic question for 
sociological theory could be put as follows: "How is it possible that subjective 
meanings become objective facticities" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967,30)? To 
avoid intricate philosophical reflections, they defined the key terms from the 
point of view of the natural attitude: "It will be enough, for our purposes, to 
define 'reality' as a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as 
having a being independent of our volition (we cannot 'wish them away'), and 
to define 'knowledge' as the certainty that phenomena are real and that they 
possess specific characteristics" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, 13). The 
revolutionary idea was to declare common sense knowledge as a central focus 
for the sociology of knowledge. Traditionally, the sociology of knowledge has 
been preoccupied with the history of ideas only; now, it must concern itself 
"with everything that passes for 'knowledge' in society" (ibid., 26). 
The authors' main thesis that reality is socially constructed, and that sociology 
has to study the ways in which this is done, was striking. The book resurrected 
Alfred Schutz' phenomenological analysis of the life-world, used it to clarify 
basic sociological concepts like role and institution, and offered a new synthesis 
not only of Weber and Durkheim, but also of Mead and philosophical anthro- 
pology (Gehlen and Plessner). Berger and Luckmann's explication of the 
media through which social order is objectified - typification, signs, symbols, 
habitualization, and so on - rendered deep insights into the richness of human 
interaction. Their analysis of the relationship between social institutions and 
the symbolic worlds of meaning (Sinnwelten) which legitimize them proved 
how conventional jargon about the "logic of institutions" obscured the actual 
processes through which institutions become social realities. They presented a 
sociological theory which conceived of social actors as competent humans, 
evaded sociological reifications, and abjured the widespread arrogance of social 
scientists (who at the time loved to talk of "false consciousness" and Freudian 
"unconscious constraints", properly identified, of course, only by themselves). 
But above all they made clear how naive an objectivist stance towards social 
reality is. Put simply: The how of social phenomena has to be explicated before 
we can attend to the what and the why. 
2. Social Construction and Ideology 
The book was received well by its critics. Indeed, at a time when the prevalence 
of Parsonian structural-functionalism was eroding and the "coming crisis of 
Western sociology" (Gouldner, 1970) was being discussed, Social Construction 
gave new orientation to many sociologists. It offered a new reading of several 
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sociological classics - different from Parsons' interpretation in his Structure of 
Social Action (Parsons, 1937) - and linked their perspectives in a fresh way. 
As Charles Lemert (1992,lO) puts it in retrospect: "To this day, I cannot think 
of a single book that presents with such exquisite parsimony so many different 
ideas so well." 
Although Berger as well as Luckmann agree that they would change very 
little in the book if they were to rewrite it today (Berger 1992, l), its impact on 
American sociology remained - in the authors' view - somewhat marginal. 
One reason was that both authors were situated "in an emphatically peripheral, 
nonelite institution" (ibid.). The other was "the orgy of ideology and utopianism 
that erupted all over the academic scene in the late 1960's, almost immediately 
after the publication of our book. Neither Luckrnann nor I had any sympathy 
with this Zeitgeist ..." (ibid.). But it was this context, as I shall point out, 
which shaped a specific - and mislead -reception of their book. 
In this respect, the situation inEurope was quite similar. Social Construction 
was translated in many languages. In Germany, for example, it was published 
at S. Fischer in 1970, opening the new series "Conditio Humana", and was 
introduced by the great Helmuth Plessner. Interestingly enough, it was not 
reviewed by the renowned Kolner Zeitschriftfiir Soziologie und Sozialpsycho- 
logie. Otherwise it was well received. Book reviewers cornmended the new, 
un-ideological approach, praised the comparatively low price of a high-quality 
book and expressed amazement that an American original was published in 
German within only three (actually four) years.' Although the sociology of 
knowledge used to be a pet theme of German readers (as Plessner notes in the 
introduction), Social Construction did not have an easy time of it. When structural 
functionalism and quantitative sociology -both imported from the United States 
after World War I1 - confronted growing criticism in the sixties, it was the 
FranlGurt school as well as neo-Marxism which reaped the benefit. Then, after 
Habermas entered into a well-publicized debate with Niklas Luhmann (who 
defended a functionalist systems theory blending Parsonian and phenome- 
nological concepts), the two became the most cited and quoted German 
sociologists of the period. 
In this intellectual context, in the United States as well as in Europe, Social 
Construction was often interpreted with a special twist. Many left-liberal 
veterans of the '60s turned to this book to make sense of life and sociology, 
detecting the arbitrariness of social constructions (cf. Lemert, 1992, 10). 
1 Helmut Dahrner in Soziale Welt (1970/71), Wolf Lepenies in FAZ (1969) und F. U. Pappi in 
Sociologica Ruralis (1971) and many others. I thank Thomas Luckmann for giving me his 
whole set of collected reviews of the book, and for a very illuminating discussion. 
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"Constructionism" became a radical perspective which helped to reveal reality, 
to strip it of ideological distortions, and to pave the way for new interpretations. 
Academic feminism is a particularly prominent example for this view. As 
inspiring as such an interpretation can be, it is far indeed from Berger and 
Luckmann's intentions. Thus Luckmann assures: "whenever someone mentions 
'constructivism' or even 'social constructionism', I run for cover these days" 
(Luckmann, 1992,4). And Berger sees much of the "constructivist" literature 
as coming from the aforementioned "ideological cauldron with which I have 
no affinity whatever" (Berger, 1992,2). 
Instead, Berger and Luclanann advocated an empirical sociology of knowledge 
which investigates the intricate ways in which reality is socially constructed. 
They adhered to the Weberian maxim that a scientist's task is to describe and 
explain social actions and their consequences as they are, but not to proclaim 
any political stance how things should be. In practice, this maxim of Wertur- 
teilsfreiheit has to be seen in its own complexities: Any empirical description 
or proposition makes use of typifications which are embedded in systems of 
relevancies, i. e. necessarily has its value implications. Thus, to see existing 
social constructions on different premises may well sharpen one's eyes for 
how they are constructed, as both Schutz and Simmel have shown thoroughly 
with their analyses of being a ~tranger.~ The main problem is not the search for 
arbitrariness in social constructions, but the way such research is done. I would 
agree here with Mary F. Rogers who brands "theoretical tokenism" which 
unduly limits the impact of Berger and Luckmann's book: "Social Construc- 
tionism often serves as little more than a theoretical shibboleth accompanied by 
a few flat propositions about how people 'construct' their identities, worldviews, 
and taken-for-granted ways of managing their affairs" (1992,6). 
3. Phenomenology and Sociology 
On the other hand, even many of those who called themselves "phenomenological 
sociologists7' did not grasp the logic of Berger and Luckmann's paradigm 
correctly. Many overlooked the central fact that the authors introduced their 
dualistic conception of the society as an objective and a subjective reality by a 
part they explicitly called '>hilosophical prolegomena" and as such "pre-so- 
ciological': the phenomenological analysis of the foundations of knowledge 
in everyday life. They draw a saict line between a phenomenological analysis 
2 Schutz (1W) and Simmel(1968[1908 1) 
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of the life-world and a sociological analysis of society: Both are "empirical", 
although not in the same sense; while the phenomenological method is 
"egological", the social scientific method is "cosmological" (cf. Luckmann, 
1973). In this sense, much of what has been labelled as "phenomenological 
sociology" had little to do with phenomenology and not much to do with 
sociology either! 
It is one of the shortcomings of Social Construction, in my view, that Berger 
and Luckmann excluded epistemological and methodological considerations. 
I admit that tactically this may have been a good move: It stressed their 
intention to proclaim an empirical sociology of knowledge (as a "Wirklich- 
keitswissenschaft") which clearly differed from the older tradition, and it opened 
the door to the many social scientists who dislike any philosophical binding. 
However, they also risked broad misunderstandings of fundamental concepts 
and missed out on a fuller analytic empowerment through Schutz' life-world 
analyses. For many it remained obscure why sociology should care about 
consciousness and subjective meanings, given their concern with social actions 
and social facts. Why should they not restrict their attention to external, 
observable behavior? Yet, it is Schutz' critical epistemological contribution to 
analyze in rich detail the act of interpretation (Verstehen) in everyday life as 
well as in the social sciences. The formal meaning structures of the (phenome- 
nologically analyzed) life-world provides, on an epistemological level, a frame 
in which the hermeneutic task of any sociological analysis, qualitative or 
quantitative, inevitably has to be pursued. How (socially derived) subjective 
knowledge involved in concrete human actions can be explicated by the 
sociologist is a methodological issue. Its implications, however, are always 
epistemological. 
Thus, it is highly illuminating to examine Social Construction in the context 
of the Structures of the Life-World (Schutz & Luckmann 1973, 1989) and of 
the respective authors' methodological writings (Luckmann 1973, for one; 
Berger & Kellner 1981). In this light, it becomes clear that the rather terse term 
"construction" parallels "constitution": Construction is a social process and 
has to be analyzed by sociology; the constitution of meaning is a subjective 
process which takes place in consciousness and has to be analyzed by 
phenomenology. Moreover, for readers bothered by the rather loose definitions 
of some central concepts in Social Construction (like "knowledge", "reality", 
"objectification" and so on), fine-grained specifications of each term can be 
found in the Structures of the we-World. Even for those skeptical of the potential 
of phenomenological analyses to evade the reflexive circle, few other books 
explicate human experience, knowledge and action, the different transcendencies 
and the complex interrelatedness of subjective and intersubjective knowledge 
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in richer detail. Unfortunately, more than twenty years passed between the 
first publication of Social Construction and the publication of the second volume 
of Structures of the Life-World. This may have been one reason that the intimate 
relationship between the two has been recognized by rather few. In the intervening 
years, as indicated above, the reception of these basic ideas had taken quite 
diverse and often divergent routes. 
4. Social Constructionism and Subjective Constructivism 
Interestingly enough, Berger and Luckmann considered the title The Social 
Construction of Reality as self-evident: they have never delivered a clear 
definition of what they meant by it. Furthermore, readers of translated versions 
of the book may well find that what is called "construction" or "constructed" in 
their language is expressed differently in the English original. But, all things 
considered, "social construction" obviously has different meanings. For one, 
the term "mnsauction" has a static as well as a dynamic aspect. In its static aspect 
it denotes a reality-as-it-is (appears), in its dynamic aspect it means the process 
of reality-construction. Then again, it makes a difference if we see a natural 
landscape with its mountains, rivers, meadows, cows, fannhouses and so on - 
a natural reality shaped by our cultural knowledge - or if we gaze at a society 
which is produced, through and through, by human actions. To understand 
what is going on in society (e. g. in a social setting), the sociologist has to grasp 
the meanings the actors themselves employ and are embedded in. 
It is one of the main theses of Social Construction that cultural constructs 
are socially stabilized by institutional structures. Constructions are thus not the 
subjective business of singular individuals. They are socially derived and 
intersubjectively shared and enacted. The social constructionism of Berger and 
Luckmann therefore stands in strong opposition to the subjective constructivism 
that people like Paul Watzlawick and others3 defend. The subjective construction 
of reality is always based on internalized cultural knowledge and - leaving 
aside deep pathological abberrations -coordinated with other human actors in 
interactions or collaboration. As Goffman poignantly puts it: "In some cases 
only a slight embarrassment flits across the scene in mild concern for those 
who tried to define the situation wrongly" (Goffman, 1974,l). 
Subjective constructivism leaves out just what Social Construction is all about: 
reality construction in interaction and conversation, by means of internalized 
3 Cf. Watzlawick 1976, 1984. 
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social objectivations and typifications, stabilized by routines, institutionalizations 
and legitimations, and so on. Viewed against this background, subjective 
constructivism is ahistorical, asocial and blind to institutions. It is noteworthy 
that phenomenologists and adherents of the methodological individualism (in 
Weber's sense) have time and again encountered harsh criticism of being "too 
subjectivist", especially in American Sociology; but in fact, it is Berger and 
Luckmann -both phenomenologists as well as methodological individualists - 
who have always incisively rejected such flat subjectivism! 
5. The Legacy 
It was Berger and Luckmann's aim to "move the sociology of knowledge from 
the periphery to the very centre of sociological theory" (Berger & Luckmann, 
1967,29). They have partly succeeded: They managed to alter the consciousness 
of many sociologists and helped to institutionalize the "sociology of knowledge7' 
as an acknowledged specially in the sociological establishment. More 
encouraging may have been the fact that members of diverse disciplines, such 
as social psychologists, anthropologists, geographers, historians, ethologists 
and theologists also showed (and still show) a strong interest in Social Con- 
struction. If we consider, for instance, that a discipline like cognitive anthropology 
moved from the linguistic analysis of terms to the investigation of idioms and 
is now slowly arriving at the notion of cultural knowledge and its complex relation 
to action? we can appreciate just how far ahead Berger and Luckmann were 
twenty-five years ago. 
In addition, Social Construction has undoubtedly played a crucial role in 
making the phenomenology of Alfied Schutz popular to sociologists. Nowadays, 
phenomenological concepts are found throughout different fields of sociology. 
The German grand theorists, Habermas and Luhmann, have incorporated 
phenomenological concepts as central elements. Presently, even rational choice 
theorists are attempting to integrate Schutz' work on "choosing among projects 
of action" to refine their approa~h.~ And in the United States, the so-called "neo- 
institutionalists" have developed an analysis that claims to draw directly on 
Social Con~truction.~ However, there is also a lively discussion under way 
4 Cf.. e. g., Holland & Quinn (1987). 
5 Cf. Hartmut Esser (1991. 1992). 
6 Cf. PoweU & DiMaggio (1991). 
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about how adequate these theorists are in handling both the phenomenological 
framework and the social constructionist perspective and its concepts? 
Berger and Luckmann themselves stayed close to Schutz. Both agree that 
their collaboration ended only because of geographical reasons (Berger, 1992, 
2; Luckrnann, 1992,4). They also chose, although remaining compatible in 
principle, to follow different roads of theoretical development. Berger has 
repeatedly advocated to return to the "big questions" which are, in his 
understanding, of a "macrosociological" sort (Berger, 1992, 2). His major 
intellectual focus after Social Construction became the problems of modernization 
and Third World Development. Since 1985 he has been Director of the Institu- 
te for the Study of Economic Culture at Boston University, working with an 
interdisciplinary group of social scientists. He still holds that the way Social 
Construction related "events within institutional structures to movements within 
the consciousness of individuals" is the best guide to deal with social issues: 
"the very concept of 'economic culture', denoting the interface between economic 
institutions and various elements of culture (ideas, religion, morality, lifestyles), 
lends itself beautifully to elaborations in terms of the sociology of knowledge" 
(Berger, 1992, 2). 
Luckmann, who has been at the University of Constance since 1970, was 
first engaged in editing Schutz' Structures of the Life-World. He then turned to 
what Berger would term a "microsociological" analysis, namely a program for 
the investigation of concrete communicative processes: 
These conceptual links, called by some a 'theory' of communicative 
genres, start from the assumption that for recurring communicative 
problems in social interactions, more or less obligatory patterns of the 
organization of the communicative process are constructed socially. 
The system of genres in use, as well as less obligatorily structured 
communication in social milieus and institutions, may be conceived as 
the communicative budget of a society. I am convinced that a description 
of continuities and changes in communicative budgets is a prerequisite 
for the description and explanation of social stability and change. It 
provides the formal empirical basis for a study of the manifold historical 
permutations of the social construction of reality. The first studies 
guided by that theoretical program looked at communicative processes 
which reconstruct various kinds of pasts: alarm calls to the fire 
7 Cf. the methodological discussion of meaning adequacy in Eberle (1984). Concerning 
Habennas' concept of "life-world", see Matthiesen (1984); regarding Esser's intelpretation 
of Schutz. see the critique by Prendergast (1992) and Srubar (1992). 
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department, gossip, conversational transmissions of ir3formation and 
wisdom, religious conversion stories, recapitulations of television 
programs, etc. The next four-year study will focus on 'moralizing' 
genres. The data will consist of public debates during the Gulf War, 
'pastoral' counselling on radio programs, anti-smoking campaigns, local 
ecology appeals, pro- and anti-abortion arguments in various public 
and semi-public contexts, and the like. (Luckmann, 1992,4 f.) 
Luckmann has continued to influence quite a strong group of German sociologists. 
In analyzing what Berger and Luckmann (1967,78) called the "conversational 
apparatus" in which a common sense of reality is constructed as an ongoing 
accomplishment in face-to-face situations, they borrow widely from 
ethnomethodology, ethnography, conversation analysis, symbolic interactionism, 
cognitive anthropology, and other specialties. By investigating the processes 
of reality construction locally and in situ, they complement the general level of 
analysis in Social Construction and materialize what had been Berger and 
Luckmann's goal from the outset: to found an empirical sociology of knowledge. 
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